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Introduction 
 
Corruption has been one of the major international concerns of the past 
decade. It is an issue that affects all countries, rich and poor, in different ways 
and to differing degrees. Exactly how corruption affects particular societies 
has, however, been the subject of some discussion in the literature. The major 
international institutions promoting governance reforms have, for example, 
persistently argued that corruption has a direct negative impact upon overall 
economic growth levels and can depress the climate for attracting 
international investment; although these are far from universally-held 
assumptions, even in the mainstream economics literature.  
 
Amidst heightened international concern for tackling the abject poverty which 
continues to affect such large sections of humanity (expressed most clearly in 
the evolution of the millennium development goals or MDGs), perhaps the 
most important concern that has been expressed about corruption is that it 
disproportionately affects the poor and marginalized, through excluding them 
from access to services or reducing the funds available for direct use in social 
programmes. Donor-country fears over corruption in the handling of 
development aid monies may also act to erode the political will necessary to 
ensure adequate international funding of the actions needed to meet MDG 
targets, whilst within Southern countries perceptions of widespread corruption 
within political life can act decisively to depress popular support for state 
reforms and/or open democratic political systems. Clearly, then, corruption – 
its extent, nature, dynamics, causation and how it might be tackled – is an 
issue of fundamental importance to those working in the field of international 
development. 
 
One of the things noticeable on a first exploration of the literature on 
corruption and development is the singular lack of attention that was devoted 
to the issue for most of the period since the second world war and, in turn, the 
sudden rediscovery of the issue towards the end of the 1980s and the 
explosion of international legislative initiatives, institutional formation and 
academic work that has occurred since then. Clearly, the end of the bipolar 
geopolitical world of the cold war and the onslaught of contemporary 
globalization appear to have presented considerable opportunities for 
international collaboration in placing the issue at the centre of the international 
stage. Nevertheless, those very same global processes also present 
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important challenges to the international community in dealing with the issue 
because of the difficulties involved in tracing international flows of capital, the 
increasing complexity of international criminal networks and non-criminal tax 
evasion networks and the complex and hazy lines between the private and 
public sectors.  
 
Since the early 1990s large amounts of public money have been spent on the 
development of new legislation at national and international levels, the 
creation of national anti-corruption programmes and the evolution of anti-
corruption departments within just about every major international 
development institution. The impact of such measures, however, has been, at 
best, partial. As such, whilst the international community should continue to 
do what it can to raise the international profile of corruption and how it might 
be better combatted, we argue that it is even more important that a more 
detailed independent assessment of the effectiveness of existing interventions 
is carried out. 
 
Our position is that the first steps towards such a review of international anti-
corruption initiatives must involve subjecting the ways in which the issue has 
been constructed in the mainstream development arenas to closer scrutiny. 
This workshop is intended to be a first step in this direction. As such, this 
paper is intended to generate debate about the meaning of corruption, its 
complexity, how it relates to particular areas of development policy 
intervention and the means whereby it might be combated (if indeed this is 
considered feasible or even desirable). Given this, what follows is (i) 
deliberately provocative, (ii) deliberately broad and (iii) deliberately polemical. 
We thought long and hard about how best to organize this session and in the 
end decided to organize it around the presentation of a series of key myths 
which we have identified as important amongst those involved in anti-
corruption activities and research. Some of these myths relate to the 
academic community, some to a kind of general common sense amongst 
development practitioners and some to those involved in the implementation 
of anti-corruption initiatives. Here, they are organized into four broad sections 
dealing with (a) basic definitions, (b) states and markets, (c) actors and anti-
corruption initiatives and (d) economic factors. 
 
 
Basic Definitions and Issues 
 
Myth One.  
Corruption is so widespread and ingrained that it cannot be combated.  
 
As opposed to some of the myths which follow below, this myth of the 
perceived impossibility of tackling corruption is one which has already been 
identified by those promoting the importance of tackling corruption on the 
international stage. In fact, it is to be hoped that anyone involved in 
development in some capacity, be it as an academic, a politician, an activist 
or a skilled practitioner, would be keen to lay this kind of myth to rest. It is, 
however, worth exploring the nuances of this type of attitude a little. These 
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types of arguments are varied. Perhaps the most understandable emanate 
from those within particular countries who feel trapped by the prevalence of 
corruption within their own society. Clearly where corruption is seen to be 
widespread, it can seem inevitable. This can lead to a form of fatalism about 
the possibilities for change amongst those who live in societies where 
corruption seems to be particularly embedded. This clearly emphasizes the 
absolutely crucial importance of involving local communities within any anti-
corruption initiatives – a factor which unfortunately, despite much rhetoric, has 
not been a central feature of most anti-corruption initiatives. It is also 
important that the local specifics of political cultures (particularly in terms of 
public attitudes towards the definition and acceptability of corruption) are 
central to the design of any such programmes, emphasizing the point, 
explored below, that corruption is a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon that 
is not amenable to quick-fix solutions. 
 
More worrying, however, is the labelling of whole societies as somehow 
warped or ‘irredeemable’ because they do not conform to the politico-cultural 
expectations of outsiders. This type of cultural insensitivity characterizes the 
perspective of some extreme free-marketeers who seek to find cultural 
explanations for the ‘unexpected failure’ of their policy recommendations and 
also underlies some of the failures of externally-formulated anti-corruption 
programmes. Knee-jerk reactions such as these are also debilitating because 
they can be used to justify the employment of bribery or other corrupt 
business practices by powerful external private sector interests in negotiating 
with governments, leading to the familiar ‘you don’t get anywhere here unless 
you do it” arguments.  Both of these aspects of this type of perspective (the 
internalized and the external) need addressing if anti-corruption activists are 
to be successful in overcoming an unhealthy fatalism about their chances of 
success. 
 
 
Myth Two.  
Corruption can be simply and effectively defined and is understood as 
meaning the same thing in all societies and cultures.  
 
One of the problems with the publications and pronouncements of the major 
international institutions on corruption is that they create the impression that 
corruption is easily identifiable and means the same thing in every 
social/cultural context. The dominant economic literature on corruption defines 
it as basically to do with the rent-seeking behaviour of individuals. For 
example the World Bank (1997:8) define it as ‘‘the abuse of public office for 
private gain.’’ This is, in our view, insufficient. Leaving aside the clearly 
inappropriate association of corruption exclusively with the public sector (to 
which we return below), such definitions are too limited because they assume 
that all corruption is both personal and monetary in nature and fail to deal with 
the interests underlying politically motivated corruption. Even within political 
science approaches to corruption, which have generally been more nuanced 
than the more econocentric approaches, there has been a tendency to focus 
upon identifying some kind of ‘universal’ standards of public office (the legal, 
norms-based and public interest approaches) which have invariably ended up 
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promoting Northern values and norms as universal. This is not to say that 
there is nothing to be gained from sharing experiences of best practice across 
cultural and political divides, but there is a need to explore more relativistic 
approaches that reflect local cultural values and explicitly recognize the 
breadth of divergent cultural and political understandings of corruption and the 
fact that they change over time. 
  
As such, the important thing when talking about corruption (and more 
importantly how to combat it) is to remember that it is multi-faceted and fluid in 
meaning. As Williams (1999) suggests, how corruption is defined depends on 
the context in which it is located, as well as the perspectives of the definers 
and their purpose in defining it. As such, as two of us argued in a recent 
paper, “analysis might more usefully centre around the more specific 
phenomena that comprise corruption or, at the very least, there should be 
greater cross-fertilization between the competing ideas of corruption, 
clientalism and rents to produce alternative hybrid terms” (Brown and Cloke, 
2004:285). The problem is that, whilst these debates might take us nearer to a 
more malleable and responsive understanding of corruption, they do not 
provide easy answers.  
 
 
Myth Three. 
Corruption is chiefly a problem in so-called developing countries.  
 
A further problem with much of the current preoccupation with corruption is 
that it has a tendency to treat the issue as (i) a feature of national societies, 
rather than an intimate part of global connectivities and (ii) characteristic 
mainly of countries at earlier stages of industrialization and development. 
These issues are connected because the tendency to situate corruption as a 
feature of ‘underdevelopment’ means that the role of external actors in the 
causation of corruption in the South is not recognized sufficiently (here we are 
thinking of factors such as the role of individual TNCs in using bribes to 
secure contracts or the weak transparency and accountability mechanisms 
frequently employed by the international institutions in the handling of 
development finance).   
 
The idea that corruption is a phenomenon that only affects the South can be 
easily countered by pointing to the succession of scandals which have rocked 
both governments (thinking in particular of the European commissioners and 
the cases of individual British MPs like Jonathan Aitken) and major 
corporations (Enron, Worldcom etc.) in the North. As Girling (1997) suggests, 
corruption does not disappear in highly industrialised, democratic societies, 
but rather it takes on new forms. Nevertheless, there is still a tendency in 
many circles to see corruption as a characteristic of ‘backward’ political 
systems or ‘young’ democracies. In its most extreme form, this type of 
perspective traces problems of corruption in Africa to the end of colonial rule, 
as if colonial administrations were models of probity and honesty and 
corruption only flourished as a result of handing over control, at 
independence. More generally, the problem is that, rather than seeing 
corruption as a complex socio-political phenomenon linked to global 
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processes and specific national cultural and political economies, the issue is 
often reduced to a kind of political backwardness which needs ‘treatment’ via 
the imposition of Northern institutional forms, legal systems and so on. 
 
 
 
Myth Four.  
All corruption is illegal.   
 
This is a simple but important point that is often missed. One common-sense 
definition of corruption defines an action as corrupt if it is illegal in the place 
where it was committed. This of course sidesteps the important debates about 
the meaning of corruption which we considered above but it also leads to a 
severely limited grasp of the ways in which corruption affects any given 
society. One of the obvious limitations is the fact that different countries’ legal 
systems may treat corruption in different ways, reflecting different institutional 
capabilities and political frameworks. However at a deeper level it also raises 
all sorts of issues about the ethical elements in discussions of corruption – i.e. 
there are many activities which citizens of a given country might identify as 
corrupt but that are not actually against the law. 
 
Just to take one example, that of corruption in service delivery, actions which 
may not actually be illegal (or certainly extremely difficult to prove as such), 
but could certainly be labelled as corrupt, include: the favouring of high value 
infrastructural projects rather than those that might serve the best interests of 
the poor, inappropriate project design, inflated costs, elite capture of project 
benefits, the delivery of low quality and/or inappropriate services, 
discrimination against women, ethnic minorities and the poor, bad behaviour, 
rude treatment, abuse, poor motivation, lack of interest in finding and fixing 
problems, and a lack of focus on outcomes. None of this is illegal in most 
national circumstances. The question is how do we tackle these sorts of 
issues in discussions of accountability and transparency when none of them 
are actually illegal?  
 
A further complication arises in those circumstances when corruption can 
become a way of making service delivery more efficient and equitable to the 
extent that it’s net effects can even on occasion be positive, at least in the 
short to medium term. In these circumstances, particularly where local people 
see it as involving the breaking of unjustifiable rules, can corruption be seen 
as a necessary evil, wrong in principal but necessary in practice? 
 
 
States, Markets And Corruption: 
 
Myth Five.  
Corruption is purely a phenomenon of the public sector and market 
liberalization and privatization automatically lead to a decline in corruption 
problems. 
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One of the most important and debilitating myths that has guided the evolution 
of anti-corruption initiatives across the South has been the idea that corruption 
is purely a phenomenon of the public sector. This perspective flows from the 
basic definitional problems which we explored above where, rather than 
locating corruption at the intersection between public and private arenas, it is 
conceived of purely as a phenomenon of the public sector. Even if we were to 
accept this definition, this should not lead us to jump to the conclusions 
promoted by USAID or the World Bank in their analyses of how to combat 
corruption. In major works on corruption (e.g. USAID’s Handbook on 
Corruption and the Bank’s first pronouncements on the issue in 1997), both 
organizations make the bald claim that the more the size of the state sector is 
reduced the less chances for corruption there are. This is incredibly 
misleading and perhaps the most important of the myths considered in this 
briefing paper. 
 
The institutions’ interpretation obscures the rising possibilities for a range of 
forms of private sector corruption that can be caused by market-led economic 
reforms and privatization. For example, White (1996) analysed the 
relationship between corruption and economic liberalisation in China and 
found that the transition to a market economy has been accompanied by 
increasingly pervasive and large-scale corruption. More generally 
privatization, in particular, appears at the very least to have created as many 
opportunities for corruption as it has solved (corrupt bidding processes, 
undervaluing of public assets, bribery in concession bidding, exploitative 
contracting arrangements, ghost companies etc.)  
 
The continued tendency (despite the supposed Post-Washington consensus) 
of the international institutions to treat the state as an enemy in need of 
‘cutting down to size’ has also impacted on the ability of state institutions to 
fulfill the role envisioned for them within anti-corruption programmes. The 
requirement of meeting greater demands for public scrutiny does not sit well 
with the continued attempts to squeeze state budgets and trim regulatory 
powers. Similarly, there is a kind of perversity to the logic which locates self-
interested rent-seeking behaviour to those in the public sector and yet relies 
upon the creation of new public bodies to tackle the issue – quite why the 
workers within anti-corruption offices are expected to be any less corrupt than 
other public sector workers is unclear. We are not arguing here that the state 
does not provide opportunities for corruption (clearly it does) but rather that 
the knee-jerk assumption that the private sector is inherently less corrupt than 
the public needs to be challenged. In fact, most corruption occurs at the hazy 
interface between the public and private spheres which is where our attention 
should be focused. 
 
 
Myth Six.  
Democratic governments are less corrupt  
 
Discussions over how and if democracy controls corruption are immensely 
complicated, not simply by attempting to define corruption, but also by 
defining what we mean by democracy. The ex-Soviet Union regularly held 
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elections in which the will of the majority was said to have prevailed by 
margins of victory unknown in western European democratic practices, and 
yet the idea of the Soviet Union being democratic would rightly have been 
dismissed out of hand. Conversely, although it may be the case (using some 
given measure such as the TI Corruption Index) that within the UK there is a 
higher degree of effective and open functioning of civil society under a 
particular form of parliamentary democracy, it is also undoubtedly the case 
that outside the UK, historically British companies and the UK government 
have at the very least turned a blind eye to corruption, if not been actively 
complicit in it. 
 
As is so frequently the case, the prevalence of corruption in a country or 
region has less to do with arbitrary definitions such as ‘democratic’ or 
‘undemocratic’ than it does with the complexity of political economy and socio-
cultural dynamics that go to make up its’ current civic reality. An example 
might be taken from Singapore, for instance, where the prevalence of a de 
facto one-party state dominated by Lee Kuan Yew and now his son scarcely 
counts as an actively democratic state, given the close control of the press, 
judiciary and political opposition that occurs – this notwithstanding, there is a 
perception outside Singapore (and by its’ own citizenry) of the country as an 
example of cleanliness in Asia (in the 2004 TI index Singapore is 5th overall 
with a score of 9.3). 
 
 
Myth Seven.  
Corruption is a technical problem requiring technical solutions 
 
This particular myth goes hand-in-hand with other corruption myths, such as 
the rich have no need to be corrupt and corruption is essentially a public 
sector problem, and is to be discerned very much as part of the orthodox 
economic discourse; people are essentially rational in both their expectations 
and their behaviour, and whether a person behaves in a certain way or not is 
controlled by logical boundaries such as marginal utilities. From this, one 
implication is that legislation and regulation will set up controlling 
mechanisms, as if (amongst other things) the controlling authority itself is 
outside or above the problem and can therefore deal with it in a neutral and 
objective manner. 
 
It is plainly the case that in a country where the average wage for policemen, 
say, is at or below the level of mere survival, then the virtual certainty is that 
the police will seek other means to supplement their income. What is not 
certain and in many cases may still be extremely unlikely, however is that 
raising the wage of the police to a comfortable level will of itself end their 
corruption. Corruption (as noted above) is a complex and multi-faceted 
phenomenon that is heavily dependent on such factors as history (particularly 
of colonialism), culture, civic structure, the political make-up of the country, 
ethnic and religious divides, clientelistic and clan-based networks and the 
record of what might be called general governance in the country. Corruption 
is at once real and perceptual, dishonest and loyal, obedient and disobedient.    
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Actors and Corruption: 
 
Myth Eight.  
Sunshine is the best disinfectant (the more we talk about corruption, the 
quicker the problem will go away)  
 
What this myth refers to is the assumption that simply because so much is 
now being said and written about corruption the situation is somehow 
automatically getting better. At the simplest level, this reflects a naive 
assumption that people are committing corrupt acts because they don’t know 
any better and that when educated into the impacts of what they are doing 
they will modify their behaviour. A further example of the same sort of thinking 
comes from the acceptance at face value of government pronouncements 
about dealing with corruption. Take, for example, the way in which USAID and 
the World Bank praised the Nicaraguan government for its National Integrity 
Plan at the same time as President Arnoldo Aleman was systematically 
siphoning off huge amounts of Hurricane Mitch reconstruction monies to his 
own ends. Just because the language of transparency and accountability has 
crept into official documentation does not mean that real changes are 
occurring in the conducting of government etc. 
 
Another way of looking at this issue, however, is that as people get to know 
more about their rights (and the responsibilities of those in positions of power 
and authority) then the more they are likely to make them live up to grand 
words over improvements in accountability etc. In explorations of corruption in 
service delivery, if service users (and particularly the poor) have information 
on their rights then this changes the incentives for corruption facing service 
providers. Although the poor also need power or some kind of leverage over 
service providers. Clearly, in addition to knowing where and how to get 
information, people also need to have the capacity and power to make it 
useable. Most effective in this context has been the right to information 
legislation (Goetz and Gaventa, 2001), community-based audits of public 
works (Parivartan in Delhi), joint state-citizen initiatives such as budget 
analysis on South Africa or expenditure tracking in Uganda, vigilance 
committees monitor municipal councils in Bolivia, or systematic Report Cards 
of user satisfaction carried out by NGOs in Bangalore.  
 
 
Myth Nine.  
Signing an International Declaration or developing a Corporate Responsibility 
Policy will automatically lead to declining corruption levels.  
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet bloc (a pivotal event of itself) there have been 
a plethora of international initiatives designed to tackle corruption, these have 
included the 1997 OECD International Convention on Combating the Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, UN 
attempts to develop legal instruments, major International Conferences (IACC 
and Global Forums), as well as regional initiatives by, amongst others, 
USAID, OAS, and the IADB. There has then clearly been a major impetus to 
‘combat corruption’ through institutional reform programmes (focussed upon 
Preliminary version – not for citation without the permission of the authors 
the poor south only, of course) funded by the international financial 
institutions. Donor conditionality for aid now regularly includes the 
enhancement of transparency and accountability and the control of corruption 
as major components. 
 
It is reasonable to suggest that this is largely smoke and mirrors, however, 
whilst the G8 not only refuse to clean up their own acts, or even to implement 
the agreed-on legislation when it is not deemed politically convenient to do so. 
For example the City of London, as a Transparency International working 
group found in 2003, is a hotspot for money-laundering on a massive scale. 
The TI group estimated the amounts being laundered to be higher even than 
UK government estimates of £18 billion per year – on the other hand, the 
federal government of Nigeria has waited seven years after making a formal 
request to the UK government with the relevant details, for any of the money 
stolen by the dictator Sani Abacha to be returned. Egregious acts of bribery 
such as those of BAE are reported every day and yet nothing is done – the 
political will to do so being absent. 
 
 
Myth Ten.  
International institutions know how to deal with corruption and are themselves 
immune from its impacts.  
 
The issue that we want to touch on here is the assumption that the 
international financial institutions (and major Northern donors) have the right 
to lecture others about how to ensure transparency and accountability in the 
use of public money. We have already addressed issues surrounding the 
limitations of IFI understandings of the nature and causes of corruption, as 
well as the continuing occurrence of corruption in supposedly more advanced 
democracies. Here, however, we want to raise a few points about the actual 
practices of the institutions themselves. I.e. “do what I say, not what I do….”       
 
As Hawley (2000) suggests many of the organizations promoting governance 
reforms in the South are not themselves the models of probity, accountability 
and transparency (in relation to their internal audit procedures for example) 
that one would expect. Concerns have been expressed in relation to the 
impacts of lobbying upon the decision-making processes of the World Bank 
and their internal audit procedures and perhaps more worryingly in relation to 
political pressures on the contracting decisions of the Interamerican 
Development Bank (Andersen, 2002). Furthermore, the responses of bilateral 
donors and the international institutions when cases of corruption do surface 
has also left a lot to be desired. For example, whilst the World Bank operates 
a blacklisting system in relations to companies found committing abuses, 
none of the companies listed there have had to pay any penalties for their 
actions.   
 
Finally, if aid/loan disbursement by the institutions and unilateral donors 
continues to be dominated by the strategic and economic interests of the most 
powerful (thinking particularly of the changes to aid budgets in light of the war 
on terror and the awarding of contracts in the ‘rebuilding’ of Iraq) then any 
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international initiatives to deal with corruption are probably doomed to failure, 
given their location within a system that is itself clearly lacking in 
accountability. 
 
 
Myth Eleven. 
If you pay people more they will be less corrupt. 
 
At first glace this assumption seems both sensible and useful. I.e. one of the 
reasons that corruption occurs in the public sector is the poor conditions of 
service and remuneration of public employees, particularly in the aftermath of 
the austerity measures pushed on governments across the South as part of 
the structural adjustment programmes of the IFIs. Public-sector corruption 
does seem to be worsened by low wages, lack of meritocratic recruitment and 
promotion, the low morale of employees, poor staff motivation, and poor 
general conditions of service. Indeed, Van Rijckeghem & Weder (1997) point 
to a negative relationship between corruption and wages across developing 
countries. 
 
However, on closer reflection, there are some problems. Firstly, if we take the 
argument to its logical extreme then we would make the assumption that (a) 
the poorest are the most corrupt group in society (rather than the major 
victims of corruption as is the case in reality) and (b) those with most money 
are likely to be the least corrupt, in other words we should leave the running of 
our societies to the traditional moneyed elites since they don’t need additional 
money and won’t be tempted to act corruptly in pursuit of it. Clearly both 
assumptions are absurd. As such, it is also clear that we need a more 
complex model of corruption causation that links propensity to act corruptly to 
factors such as the existence of incentive schemes, internal institutional 
governance and the external legal and political environment (reflecting the 
degree of professionalization of the state bureaucracy), as well as the 
conditions of service and remuneration arrangements for public employees. 
Thus, incentive reforms should be accompanied with wider reforms in the 
internal organisation of bureaucracies. 
 
 
Myth Twelve.  
Corruption is primarily an ethical issue 
 
Corruption is often presented as simply an issue of right and wrong. There is 
certainly an ethical component to corruption but those interested in combating 
it also have to consider awkward cost-benefit assessments of the costs of 
combating corruption versus the costs imposed by corruption (as well as the 
political motivations underlying corrupt activities). Furthermore, whilst 
corruption may involve interventions that target the ethical principles of 
individuals, they will mostly also have to recognize the need for sanctions. 
Ultimately, the most appropriate and pragmatic solution to dealing with 
corruption will probably relate less to ethical debates of right and wrong and 
more to interventions that seek to redistribute political power between social 
actors and influence social behaviour in particular directions through the 
targeted use of incentives and sanctions. 
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The more ethically-generated policies frequently fail to address the real 
causes of corruption. Codes of Conduct, for example, tend to be drafted at the 
top by senior officials, so codes fail to reflect adequately, the situation and 
aspiration of staff at all levels.  
 
 
 
Corruption and the Economy. 
 
Myth Thirteen.  
There is a direct relationship between corruption and economic growth.  
 
The idea that corruption always negatively affects economic growth is 
frequently treated as a truth amongst the anti-corruption fraternity. The history 
of the development of virtually all the primary industrializing countries 
contradicts this, however; Great Britain and the USA experienced massive 
increases in global economic and political power when corruption was the 
norm in local and national politics. In the USA from the 1860s onwards 
administrations such as that of Taft and of Ulysses S. Grant were extensively 
corrupt and ‘graft’ in the US was widespread at the beginning of the 20th 
century. 
 
As if this were not enough, however, the more recent history of countries such 
as South Korea (Moran 1998), in which a series of repressive and corrupt 
military governments oversaw a prolonged period of massive and relatively 
egalitarian growth and Japan, virtually all of whose modern economic success 
has taken place under the aegis of a political system characterised by 
nepotism, clientelism, amakudarism (Maruyama 1996) and massive bribery, 
seem to challenge the accepted wisdom.  
 
Earlier literature on economic development, equally devoid of a political 
economy context, often suggested that corruption might be a source of 
innovation and helped release resources for productive activities – often 
‘lubricating the wheels of economic growth’ as it were. This is also associated 
with one of the other myths that we identified, that ‘corruption does not hurt 
the poor.’ It would be difficult to look at the massive corruption and poverty in 
a country like Nigeria, however, where figures suggest that 80% of the oil 
wealth in that country goes to no more than 1% of the population, or indeed 
the persistence of widespread poverty in an oil-wealthy country like 
Venezuela where (at least until 1998) corruption dominated the political 
system, and agree with this perception either. 
 
 
Myth Fourteen.  
Corruption is fundamentally an economic issue  
 
The current dominance of perspectives that treat corruption as entirely about 
individual rent-seeking and personal enrichment ignore corrupt activities that 
reflect much more complex motivations and wider political/societal issues and 
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goals. As Winter (2000) points out: “A remarkably candid 1996 U.S. 
Government Accounting Office study observed that “much of the impetus 
behind U.S. participation in the Bank during the Cold War era was derived 
from the perceived utility of the Bank in containing communist expansionism 
in the developing world. One Bank official commented, for example, that 
because of U.S. concern about communist insurgency in the area, the Bank 
remained active in several sub-Saharan African countries long after the 
corrupt nature of these governments became evident.” 
 
There are numerous examples where the G8 countries not only ignore 
rampant corruption when it suits them to do so, but actively profit from it 
because of geo-strategic concerns (al-Yamameh in Saudi Arabia) and 
historically have encouraged it, as in the case of the Philippines under Marcos 
and Indonesia under Suharto. As the World Bank itself says: “What seems to 
us today an obvious economic issue was then considered too politically 
sensitive, or simply too political per se, and thus outside the limits of the 
Bank’s non-political mandate (This was also true for the vast majority of other 
development agencies bilateral and multilateral.)…” (World Bank 2001) 
 
Further than this, however, economics itself is a geo-political issue, 
particularly in the case of structural adjustment: “Liberalization….has 
contributed to a more generalized process of political decay. This reduces the 
incentives for probity on the part of officials and politicians, and creates a 
widespread social alienation from the political process” (Harris –White and 
White 1996. The neo-liberal account which has driven the structural 
processes of the 1980s and 1990s, far from decreasing opportunities for rent-
seeking public servants, is generally accepted to have increased opportunities 
for corruption as the state has been rolled back and deregulation has 
proceeded apace in countries particularly where the state and the legal 
system were undeveloped and ineffective already.  
 
 
Conclusion: 
 
This is the point at which we would normally be expected to present an 
overview of our argument and we imagine our blueprint for how corruption 
should be tackled. This will not be forthcoming. As we established in the 
introduction to this paper, this was to be treated as a preliminary venture 
designed to be provocative and to ask some hard questions about the current 
consensus on tackling corruption. As such, we recognize that there 
contradictions between some of the points that we have raised here and that 
we could be accused of slinging mud without offering something constructive 
in its place. We hope, however, that participants in this workshop will enter 
into the spirit in which this paper was written and work with us in exploring the 
significance of some of the issues that we have raised here. 
 
 
 
 
